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ABSTRACT
Under certain conditions, the re-supply capability of
a combatant force may be limited by the characteristics of
the transportation network over which supplies must flow.
Air strikes by an opposing force may be used to reduce the
capacity of that network; the effects of such strikes vary
for differing missions and targets. With only a limited
number of sorties available, the strike planner must decide
which targets to hit, and with how many sorties. A com-
putational procedure is developed for determining the
optimum strike plan for minimizing network flow capacity.
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LIST OF SYMBOLS
(i,j) -an arc connecting nodes i and j
U. . -the maximum capacity of arc (i,j) in tons per day
L. . -the minimum capacity of arc (i,j) in tons per day
m. . -the actual capacity of arc (i,j) in tons per day
C. . -the number of sorties required to reduce the
capacity of arc (i,j) by one unit
K -the total number of sorties available for a given
day
x. . -the actual flow existing in arc (i,j)
Q -the total flow passing through a network per day
S -the length of route r, for any m.
.
S* -the length of route r when all m. . = L.
S 1 -the minimum achievable value of S
r r
C -the number of sorties required to reduce the
length of route r to S
C* -the number of sorties required to reduce the
length of route r to S*
C -the number of sorties required to reduce the
length of route r to S
'
R -the rth shortest route from source to sink,
r
with all m. . set = L.
.
A -the arc in route r with the zth highest value
rz ^
of C.
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I . INTRODUCTION
General ; In a military campaign, the ability of one or both
of the forces to carry on may depend directly on their abil-
ity to transport materiel some distance overland. This is
particularly true in the case of armed aggression by one
nation upon a contiguous or near-contiguous nation, and is
accentuated when the aggressor is denied the use of sea
communications, either by geographical considerations or by
overwhelming sea supremacy on the part of the opponent.
The amount of materiel required to support a military
force in the field may vary from as much as sixty pounds per
man per day, as for the U.S. forces in Korea, to as low as
perhaps two or three pounds per man per day for a hit-and-
(2) . .
run guerilla force . In any case, there is some minimum
rate of supply required to sustain a combatant force; if
the rate drops below this level the force must either reduce
its size or curtail its activities. Accordingly, it is to
the advantage of the opponent of such a force to reduce the
resupply capability as much as possible.
An aggressor's ability to supply himself may be limited
by one of three factors: the number of vehicles available
for transporting goods from supply bases to the fighting
force; the amount of goods on hand and available for ship-
ment from supply bases to the field; or the nature of the
transportation system between supply areas and the front.
In ease case, air strikes can be used to reduce the
aggressor's re-supply capability.
(3) . .Durbin has outlined a procedure for determining
maximum cargo flow as a function of available vehicles, and
for sequentially selecting and destroying the most vital
link in the transportation network until a predetermined
number of links has been destroyed or until flow has been
stopped. Wollmer ' has developed a method for determin-
ing the n most vital links in a network, both when flow
through the network is limited by the number of vehicles,
and when it is limited by the network configuration itself;
in both cases he assumed that the capacity of a given link
can be reduced to zero. In none of these studies was the
cost of interdiction considered.
This paper will address only the situation where flow
through the transportation system is limited by the capac-
ities of the various road and rail segments comprising the
system, and will take into consideration the number of air
strikes required to effect reduction in the capacity of each
arc and the limitations on the total number of air strikes
available. The time period considered will be one 24-hour
day. Such a scenario is considered particularly apposite
to the current war in Viet Nam, where the transportation
system involved in the resupply of VC/VNA forces is not
overly sophisticated, and political considerations have
placed restrictions on the number of interdiction sorties
available each day. Furthermore, since the same political
considerations have dictated allowing the North Vietnamese
to import both supplies and supply vehicles with impunity,
it seems reasonable to assume that the supply capability
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of the VC/VNA forces is limited by the transportation net-
work used to transport goods into South Viet Nam.
Any particular stretch of road or rail has some upper
limit on the number of tons per day of goods which it can
support. In the case of roads, this upper limit is depen-
dent upon surface type, surface conditions, pavement width,
(7)
and terrain. Holliday has prepared a detailed and com-
prehensive method for estimating such capacities. The
capacity of a railroad, when not bounded by the number of
available locomotives and rolling stock, may be limited by
the characteristics of a particular bridge or trestle, by
the type of roadbed, or by the service facilities available
throughout the network.
The use of air strikes against a given stretch of road
or rail reduces its capacity to some extent, whether by
cratering a road, destroying railroad track, destroying
fixed targets such as bridges and fuel or supply depots, or
simply (as in the case of armed reconnaisance flights) by
deterring the enemy from using that segment of road.
In general, the greater the number of sorties used
against a section of road, the greater the reduction in its
transportation capacity. Eventually, however, the principle
of diminishing returns takes effect to the extent that, for
practical purposes, additional sorties yield no further re-
duction. Experience ' ' has indicated that this lower
limit, measured in tons per day, is always greater than
zero, as there are myriad methods available for use in count-
ering an interdiction campaign, including, for example, the
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construction of by-passes, shuttling traffic between road
or rail cuts, camouflage, the use of coolie labor for re-
pairs, anti-aircraft flak traps, elaborate warning systems,
extensive pre-deployment of repair equipment, and decep-
tion— such as removing a span from a bridge by day, making
(3)it appear unserviceable, and replacing it after nightfall .
The most dramatic reduction in capacity as a result of
air strikes occurs in railroads, owing to the vulnerability
of track to destruction from the air. But even in this area,
Korean experience showed that coolies, working at night, can
( 6 )
repair a rail cut in eight hours. Thus, even in the area
of maximum returns per interdiction sortie, the force being
interdicted still retains the ability to move some amount
of goods over a given segment of its transportation system
within 24 hours. This non-zero lower limit on segment
capacity will later be seen to be important.
The Strike Planning Problem : Consider the problem facing
the strike planner in determining what targets to hit on a
given day. Assuming that his objective is interdiction of
the enemy's supply lines, and that the enemy's supply
capability is network-limited, he wishes to reduce the
capacity of the network as much as possible. He knows the
capacity of each segment of the transportation system in
tons per day, and thus what the total network capacity is;
furthermore, he knows, for each segment, the minimum value
to which he can reduce the capacity, and the number of sorties
required to accomplish this reduction. If there were no
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limit on the number of sorties available to him, he could
simply direct that each segment receive the number of sorties
required to reduce its capacity to a minimum, and thus he
would be assured that the network capacity had been reduced
to the absolute minimum possible.
If, however, the number of sorties available to him is
limited, he is faced with a problem of allocating scarce
resources: how many sorties should be flown against each
segment in the next 24 hours in order to reduce as much as
possible the enemy's ability to transport goods during that
period?
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II. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
The object of this study is to find a solution procedure
for the strike planning problem. An algorithm will be de-
veloped for solving the problem under the assumptions that
upper and lower limits on road capacities, as well as the
amount of reduction per sortie, are known deterministically
,
and the reduction in capacity per sortie is linear between
the upper and lower limits of capacity (although this
restriction is by no means necessary, as will be demonstrated
in Section V) . No attempt will be made to take into account
the vulnerability of the attacking aircraft, or the varying
amounts of time required to restore flow capacity over road
segments which have been attacked.
The solution procedure to be developed on the following
pages uses as inputs the maximum capacity of each road seg-
ment, the minimum value to which that capacity can be reduced,
the number of sorties required to effect such reduction, and
the total number of sorties available for use. As outputs,
it provides the set of road segments which should be attacked,
the number of sorties to be used against each of these seg-
ments, and the total flow capacity of the network after
attack.
14
III. THE MODEL
The transportation system may be represented by a net-
work of numbered nodes and associated arcs. Each arc (i, j)
represents a section of road or rail, and is capable of
passing a known quantity, U. ., of supplies per day; such
capability is assumed to be two-directional . A node may be
a town, an intersection, or any place where it is useful to
distinguish between road capacities on either side of the
node
.
The network is assumed to have a single source, node
1, and a single sink, node n. If, in fact, there is more
than one source (or sink) , an artificial node may be construc-
ted, with an artificial arc connecting it with each actual
source (or sink) . The capacity of each of these artificial
arcs can be any value which is greater than or equal to the
sum of the capacities of the arcs leading out of the actual
source node or into the actual sink node.
Each arc is represented by (i,j), where the two integers,
i and j , correspond to the numbers of the nodes which the
arc connects. As flow capacity is two-directional, it is
of no consequence which number is written first. However,
when the context is that of an actual flow occurring in a
particular direction, the designation (i,j) indicates that
flow moves from i to j
.
The capacity of arc (i,j) at any time is designated
by m. .. The value of m. is equal to U . if no air strikes
are launched against arc (i,j). The use of strikes against
the arc may reduce m. down to a value of L . . (but no lower)
,
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or to any intermediate value. This reduction is assumed for
the time being to be a linear function of the number of
sorties. The amount of reduction per sortie may vary from
arc to arc. The number of sorties required to reduce the
capacity of arc (i,j) by one unit is C. .; the total number
of sorties available on a particular day is K. Thus,
L . . < m. . < U . . and
13 - 13 - 13
I (U. . - m. .) C. . < K.
all (1,3) j j j
The actual flow passing over arc (i,j) is denoted by
x. .. The total flow passing through the network is Q. The
problem of the force which is shipping supplies and materiel
through the network is a standard maximum flow problem :
Maximize Q = T x, . = T x.v
• I3 v in
subject to 1 x. . - 1 x, . = 0, i = 2,3,..., n-1
3
J k
and < x.. < m. < U.., i = 1,2,..., n
— 13 — 13 — 13 . -10 • / •J J J 3=1,2,..., n, 1 7* 3 ,
where, for arcs (i,j) which do not exist, it is understood
that U. . =0. The first set of constraints is a consequence
of the principle of flow conservation at the nodes; i.e.,
the total flow out of any node must equal the total flow
into that node
.
The problem facing the interdicting force is not so
easy to state: it is only indirectly concerned with minim-
izing the actual flow in the network. Under the assumption
that flow is network-limited (and therefore not limited by
the number of vehicles or the quantity of supplies at the
16
source)
,
it is not necessarily true that the interdictor
would wish to strike only at those arcs over which the
existing flow is traveling. To do so would, of course,
destroy some quantity of goods and vehicles on the road,
but they are replaceable. Additionally, although the capac-
ity of these arcs would be reduced, this reduction may or
may not reduce the overall network capacity. The force mov-
ing the goods need only re-route his supply vehicles, and
he has suffered no loss in his ability to transport goods.
In short, the interdiction effort is aimed at minimizing flow
capacity (thus, ultimately, the flow itself), rather than
immediately minimizing flow.
In order to state the problem facing the interdictor, it
is useful to introduce the notion of a cut set. A cut set
,
for a network of undirected arcs, is defined to be a set of
arcs which, if removed from the network, separate the source
from the sink. The value of a cut set is defined as the
sum of the capacities of the arcs comprising the cut set.
The minimum cut set of a network is that cut set whose value
is the smallest.
(5)The Max-flow Min-cut Theorem states that the maximum
possible flow through a network is equal to the value of the
minimum cut set in the network. Thus the interdicting force
seeks to use its sorties so as to minimize the minimum cut
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set of the interdicted network, or
Minimize £ m .
.
,
(over all (i,j) XJ
cut sets) e cut set
subject to 1 (U. . - m. .) C. . < K, i = 1,2,. ..,n
(all ±J 1J 1: j = 1,2, . . .n,i ^ j
ifj)
and L.. <m.. <U.. .
ID - ID - ID
A helpful device in the solution of this problem is the
notion of the topological dual of a network. A topological
dual may be constructed as follows * : to the original
(primal) network add an artificial arc connecting source to
sink. Place a node in each mesh of the primal; let the source
of the topological dual be the node in the mesh above the
artificial arc and the sink the node below it. For each arc
in the primal, except the artificial arc, construct an arc
that intersects it and joins the nodes in the meshes on either
side of it. The lengths of the arcs in the topological dual
correspond to the capacities of the arcs which they intersect
in the primal. The values of U. ., L. ., and C. . are identical
ID ID ID
to those of the primal arcs, and they now represent the upper
and lower limits of arc length, and the cost of reducing arc
length by one unit.
Each route through the topological dual corresponds to
some cut set of the primal. Thus the problem of minimizing
the minimum cut set (after interdiction) becomes one of
minimizing the post-interdiction shortest route through the
topological dual.
18
It should be noted that the concept of the topological
dual applies only for planar networks; i.e., those which
can be represented on a plane such that no two arcs inter-
sect except at a node. Land transportation networks are
generally planar networks, particularly in the case of
rural systems such as that in Viet Nam.
19
IV. SOLUTION PROCEDURE
Preview : The algorithm presented below solves the strike
planning problem in the following manner: the topological
dual is first constructed, and all arc lengths are consid-
ered reduced to their minimum values . The shortest route
through the topological dual and the number of sorties re-
quired to reduce it to this length are then determined.
If the sorties required are not more than those available,
the problem is solved; the primal network capacity can be
reduced to the value of this length and no lower. If the
sorties required to effect this reduction are more than
are available, we systematically reduce the number of sorties
flown, concurrently increasing route length (this procedure
can be likened to "un-flying" the requisite number of sor-
ties) . We begin the un-flying procedure with that arc which
requires the highest number of sorties per unit reduction,
then proceed to the arc requiring the second-highest number,
etc., until the total sorties flown equals the number avail-
able. The minimum value to which this particular route can
be reduced has now been determined.
The second shortest route is then determined, and the
above procedure repeated for it, and then the third shortest,
etc. The algorithm terminates when either of two conditions
arises
:
a) A route is found whose minimum length can be
attained with the available sorties. All re-
maining routes (with the exception of ties)
have minimum values greater than the one just
20
examined, and thus no further routes need
be examined (again, except for ties).
b) A route is found such that the final length
of some previously considered route (after
the necessary increases in route length have
been made by un-flying the required number
of sorties) is less than the minimum length
of this route. No further routes need be
examined, as all those remaining have min-
imum lengths greater than a route which has
already been found achievable with the
available sorties.
If, at any time during the process of increasing route
length by un-flying sorties, the length of a route exceeds
the final route length for some previously considered route,
the particular route under examination need be considered
no further (although, of course, subsequent routes must
still be examined until one of the conditions above has been
met) .
The rth Shortest Route: An integral part of the algorithm
is the determination of the rth shortest route through the
topological dual. A procedure for finding the rth shortest
route is given below.
It is first necessary to determine the shortest route
from the source to each node. The general problem of
21
route minimization can be stated as (5)
Minimize £
(all
arcs)
m . ,x . .
ID ID
subject to EX =
hi
and x. > for all arcs.
ID -
where E represents the node-arc incidence matrix of the
network, and X is the vector of x. .'s. It is useful to
iD
state the dual of this problem, which is to
Maximize V, - V
1 n
T T
subject to E V <_ m
,
where V is the column vector of the dual variables V.
i
(which are unrestricted in sign) , and m is the row vector
of m. .'s. The following algorithm is based on this dual
iD
problem.
Shortest Route Algorithm: To find the shortest route to
any node
,
1) Start with any feasible dual (for example, V. = for all
i if m. . > for all (i,j) ) .
iD -
2) For node j, scan all arcs (i,j) and set
V . = min (m. + V. ) .
D i iD i
Repeat this step until all nodes have been inspected
with no change in V. values.
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3) A tree has been found consisting of all arcs having
V. - V. = m. .. The trunk of this tree connects the
1 i ID
source with the sink and is the minimum route.
The rth Shortest Route Algorithm: The following algorithm
for determining the rth shortest route is suggested by
Bellman and Dreyfus.
(r)Let V. denote the rth shortest route from the source
D
(r)to node j. V' = . Further, let
min, (•) denote the absolute minimum of (•),
min~ (•) denote the second smallest value of (•)/
min. (•) denote the ith smallest value of (•).
The shortest route from the source to node j is then
V . = min (V. + m.
.
)
.
: . i 13
The second shortest route is
(2)
V . = min
D
(2)
min, (V. + m.
.
)
1 l ID
min~ (V.
2 l
(1)
+ m.
.
)
ID
In general, for the rth shortest route we may write
(r)
V. = min
D
min
1
(v| r) + m
i
.)
I r-1}
min
2
(V^ ' + mi .)
(2)
min
r _ 1
(V.)
;
+ mij )
min
r
(v{ 1) + mij )
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To find the rth shortest route from the source to node
j we begin by finding the shortest route using the algorithm
given above. Next we find the second shortest route by
modifying the second step of the shortest route algorithm
(replace
(2)
rmin, (V
1 1
V. = min (m. + V. ) by V
.
D ±
ID i * D
= min
(2)
-min-, (V
2 i
(1)
+ m.
. ) i
ID
+ m.
.
) -
ID
) .
Then we find the third shortest route, and so on. The
(r)
algorithm terminates after we obtain a value of V and3 n
the path from source to sink which generates this value.
24
The SIRL Algorithm : In the presentation of the SIRL (Selec-
tively Increasing Route Length) Algorithm, a feasible route
length is defined as one which can be achieved by using no
more than the available sorties. To facilitate the presen-
tation, the following variables are defined:
K = the total number of sorties available for use,
S = the length of route r, for any m.
.,
S* = the length of route r when all m. . = L.
.,
r 3 1 j ij
S 1 = the minimum feasible value of S
,
r r
C = the number of sorties required to reduce the
length of route r to S
,
C* = T (U. . - L.
.
) C .
.
, the number of sorties
r (i,j)eR
r
l 3 l3 l 3
required to reduce the length of R to S* ,
C = the number of sorties required to reduce S v to
r ^ r
S' (if S' = S*, then C = C* < K.
r r r r r —
Otherwise, C' = K)
.
R denotes the rth shortest route from source to sink, with
r
all m. . = L. ., and A denotes the arc with the zth highestij ij rz
value of C. . in route r. The expression (U . . - L. .) is
equivalent to (U. . - L. .) for arc A .
1 J 1 j -L *•
The algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Construct the topological dual of the network.
Set r = 0; set all itk. = 1^ . .
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2. Set r = r + 1. Determine R and its length S*.
r 3 r
If S* > some previous S!
,
go to step 7.
3. Compute C* . If C* > K, go to step 4. If
C* < K, determine R. , S*, and C* for i = r + 1,
r — ' i ' r l '
r + 2, .... until some S* > S* (to insure inclu-
l r
sion of all ties) . Ignore any route for which
C* > K. Go to step 7.
4. Y = (C* - K) sorties must be un-flown. Rank the
r
arcs in R in descending order of C. .. Set Z = 0.
r 3 lj
5. Set z = z + 1. For A , increase arc length to
rz
'
^
Y
min (U . . ; L . . + = ) .
11 in C. .
Y
a) If U. < L. +—=—
,
go to step 6.in in C. . ' cJ J 13
Yb) If U. . > L. . + =— , S has been increased toll—il C . .' r
S' = S + -^— . C* = C - Y = K. Return to step 2
r r C . . r r ci:
6
.
Route length has been increased such that
S = S + (U. - L. .)
r r ID i j rz
a) If S > some previous S.1 , disregard R from
further consideration and return to step 2.
b) If S < all previous S!,Y-(U..-L..) c..
r — ^ i' ij ii rz ^ij
still remains to be unflown.
Set Y=Y-(U. -L..) C. and return to
lj ij rz ii
step 5.
26
7. Compare all values of S! and select the route for
which S! is a minimum. In case of ties, select
the route for which C! is smallest. The value of
S' represents the minimum achievable network
capacity. The number of sorties required to effect
reduction to this level is C. The number of
r
sorties to be flown against each arc of this route
(and therefore against each corresponding arc in
the primal cut set) is (U. - L. .) C. ., except forc 1 j 1 j 1 j ' v
those arcs whose lengths were increased by step 5.
For these arcs, the number of sorties to be flown
is • N
C. . U. . - min (U. .; L. . + -^—)
,
where Y is the last value of Y obtained in step 6.
Example : Consider the transportation network of Figure 1.
The three numbers shown for each arc represent U. ., L.
.,
and C. ., respectively. Suppose, for this problem, that
K = 80 sorties.
The asterisks represent the nodes of the topological
dual, and the dashed lines its arcs. Note the inclusion of
(9 1)the artificial source-to-sink arc ' for use in construc-
ting the topological dual; note also that the numbers on the
nodes of the topological dual are unrelated to the node
numbers of the primal.
27
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Figure 1. An Example Network
28
Figure 2 . The Topological Dual
Figure 2 shows the topological dual, by itself, with
the "transferred" arc information. The minimum- length route
through this network before any interdiction has taken place
(1,4,6,8,9), with a length of 64 units. This length is
equivalent to the value of the maximum flow possible through
the primal network.
Proceeding in accordance with the algorithm, we first
reduce all arc lengths to their L. . values. The shortest
route, R-, , is then found to be (1,4,6,8,9); its length is
29
S* = 30. The corresponding value of C* is (15 - 7) x 3 +
(15 - 9) x 6 + (13 - 5) x 4 + (21 - 9) x 6 = 164 sorties.
As this value is 84 sorties greater than the 80 available,
we must un-fly 84 sorties. We find that the two arcs (4,6)
and (8,9) have identical values of C . =6, which are great-ly ' ^
er than the C. . 's of all other arcs in R, . It is inconse-
iD 1
quential which of these two arcs we select as A,
,
; let us
arbitrarily choose (8,9). We increase the length of this
84
arc to min (21; 9 + —g) = 21. Route length has now been
increased to S, = 30 + (21 - 9) = 42. 84 - (21 - 9) x 6 =
12 sorties remain to be un-flown. Selecting (4,6) as A, „
,
12
we increase the length of (4,6) to min (15; 9 + —g) = 11.
This increases the length of R, to 44, while reducing C,
to its final (and feasible) value of C* = 80 sorties.
Thus 44 is the minimum length to which this route can
feasibly be reduced.
We next determine R~ to be (1,4,6,5,9), resulting in
St = 31 and C* = 120 sorties. Again, some sorties must be
un-flown. Ap, is seen to be (4,6) with C.
fi
= 6. We in-
crease this arc's length to U.
fi
= 15, thereby increasing
S~ to 37, and leaving 4 sorties to be un-flown. A„ 2 is
(5,9); C 59 = 5. We achieve feasibility (S' = 80) by in-
creasing the length of (5,9) by 0.8 units, resulting in
S^ = 37.8
R~ is next determined; it is (1,2,5,9). St = 32, and
C* = 160. Increasing the length of A^, (arc (1,2)) to iits
maximum value of U 1? = 20, we increase S^ to 44. Though
our C. is still at the infeasible value of 88, we need
30
proceed no further with this route, as it has already been
increased in length to where it is equal to S' and greater
than SI
R
4
is found to be (1,4,6,7,9), with S* = 34 and
C* = 153 sorties. Selecting (6,7) as A.,, we increase S.
to a value of 38 while reducing C, to 88. Again, while we
still have not reached feasibility, S. is greater than SI;
therefore we can proceed to the next route.
We next find R
5
to be (1,4,7,9). We compute C* = 129
and SJ = 35. Decreasing C5 to 93 sorties increases S- to
42, which is greater than SI; thus we go to the next route.
R
fi
, which is (1,4,6,5,8,9), has a minimum length of
S£ = 38. As this and all subsequent S* are greater than
SI, we need examine no further routes.
Comparing the S
!
, we see that the minimum
S! is SI = 37.8, which is therefore the minimum value to
l 2
which we can reduce the capacity of the primal network.
This reduction is obtained by flying 24 sorties against arc
(8,9), 20 sorties against arc (5,6), and 36 sorties against
arc (2,6) in the original network.
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V. DISCUSSION
Finiteness : The algorithm terminates in a finite number of
steps, since in no case is it necessary to examine any route
more than once, and the number of routes in a finite network
is finite. The algorithm converges toward the point where
it will terminate, since for each successive iteration the
minimum value of the S!s thus far determined is less than
1
or equal to its value at the end of the previous iteration,
each successive S* is greater than or equal to its predeces-
sor, and the algorithm terminates when some S* is greater
than the minimum of the previous S! 's.r 1
Sensitivity Analysis : One convenient feature of this
solution procedure is that the SIRL algorithm generates,
for each route through the topological dual, simultaneous
values of S. and C., which can be used for a plot of sensi-
1 i' r
tivity of minimum achievable route length versus available
sorties. The value of K can be specified as low as desired
in order to determine the optimal sortie program over a
wide range of available sorties. Such a procedure may be
very useful to the strike planner: it may reveal, for ex-
ample, that some small increase in the number of available
sorties would dictate an entirely different strike plan,
and would allow significantly better reduction in network
capacity.
Figure 3 is a plot of route length (hence, network
capacity) versus sorties for routes R, through R^ of the
example problem. The value of K ranges from zero to the
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point where no further reduction can be obtained on any of
the routes considered. Note that, in this example, R~ is
the route which would receive air strikes for 12 < K < 160.
Outside this range of K values, R, can be reduced further
than R„. It is also worthy of note that we get virtually
no improvement in our ability to reduce network capacity
for K > 120 sorties.
Modification for L . . = : One immediately apparent weakness
of the algorithm is the case where a large number of routes
have identical minimum values, which could necessitate the
examination of each of these routes, particularly when K
is small. The occurrence of a large number of identical
minimum lengths is highly improbably when the L. . (or most
of the L. .) are non-zero. If all or most of the L. are
ID i:
zero, of course, we have a number of zero-length minimum
routes through the topological dual. Such an eventuality
could be provided for by modifying step 1 of the SIRL
algorithm to read as follows:
1. Construct the topological dual. Examine all L. ,'s.
a) If some L. > 0, then set r = and go to
step 2.
b) If all L. . =0, set m. . = U. and find the
ID ID ID
route of minimum length in the dual network.
Calculate C* for this minimum route where
c* = y U. .C.
(i,j) ^ 1: '
min route
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If C* > K, set r = 0, set all m. - L.
.
,
ID ID
and go to step 2
.
If C*
_< K, terminate..
The effect of this modification is that we find the
shortest uninterdicted route and see if we feasibly can
reduce it to its minimum value, i.e., zero. If not, we
then proceed to the standard algorithm and examine routes
at random until one is found which can feasibly be reduced
to zero. If none is found, of course, we must determine
minimum feasible length of every route.
Suppose, in using step 1 (b) of the modified algorithm,
we find that C* > K, but only by a very small amount. Then
it would be worthwhile examining the second shortest uninter-
dicted route, and perhaps the third, etc., until hopefully
a C*
_< K is found.
It should be noted that if, in step 1 (b) , a C* _< K is
found, the algorithm terminates with a feasible reduction
of network capacity to zero, but some other subsequent value
of C* , which will remain unexamined, might very well be
smaller than the one which terminated the algorithm. Thus
under these conditions we obtain a feasible solution, but
are not guaranteed that it is the one requiring the least
sorties. A similar condition prevails if, failing to find
a C* < K, we return to the standard algorithm: as soon as
we find any feasible means of reducing network capacity to
zero, we terminate, even though some other combination of
fewer sorties might also reduce it to zero.
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Incorporating the modification outlined above, where
necessary, would hopefully eliminate the necessity of
examining every route except in cases of very small K.
Assumptions : The assumption of deterministically known val-
ues of U. ., L. ., and C. . is highly artificial, particularly
for L. . and C. .. In reality, these quantities are random
variables with unknown distributions.
The quantity U. . can be determined most easily (using
Holliday's method) , but L. and C. . are different matters.
.13j . _ 13
A value of L . . might be estimated by hypothesizing the max-
imum reasonable amount of damage which might be inflicted
by some large number of air strikes, and then using Hol-
liday's method on the "revised" road segment, attempting
to account for short-time emergency measures such as
shuttling, hand-carrying, etc., which might be employed
by the interdicted force. Also, implicit in the estimate
of L . . is the degree to which damage to the road segment
can be restored in one day; it might be possible to estimate
road capacity immediately after a strike, to estimate the
capacity which might be achieved by one day's repair by the
interdicted force, and to take the average of these two
figures as L. . .
Estimating values for C. . is as difficult as estimating
ID
values for L. .. Information on the distributions of L. and
1: iD
C. could be obtained through tests similar to the RAND
ID *
(7)Corporation field tests in Thailand in 1962 by using air-
craft to launch strikes against the test roads and deter-
mining capacity after each successive strike. Such strikes,
36
in addition to indicating the maximum extent to which capac-
ity could be reduced and providing information on the dis-
tributions of L. . and C. ., would also provide an insight
into the general behavior of arc capacity with respect to
sorties— whether capacity is a linear function of sorties,
or whatever.
Intuition suggests that a plot of arc capacity versus
sorties might not be linear (as was assumed in the model)
,
but rather a curvilinear function similar to the solid curve
of Figure 4
.
- Sort. cs
Figure 4. Arc Capacity versus Number of Sorties
However, such non-linear functions can be handled with-
out too much difficulty. The actual curve can be approx-
imated as closely as is desired by a series of piece-wise
linear segments (dashed line)
.
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If linearity were assumed, the arc (i,j) would be
represented as
UinUfrQj,
If we wish to incorporate the piece-wise linear approx-
imation to the actual curve, it is only necessary to con-
struct a parallel set of arcs, each corresponding to a
straight portion of the dashed line of Figure 4
:
By this approximation method, any curve can be incor-
porated into the model with no change in the procedure of
the algorithm, and little increase in the complexity of the
solution.
Applications : The results of this paper would seem to be
immediately applicable for strike planning purposes in
Southeast Asia. In the absence of data from controlled ex-
periments, rough estimates of L. . and C. . could be obtain-
able from experience gained in the Vietnamese war.
The nature of the road and rail complex which comprises
the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" and the importation routes into
North Viet Nam is probably of a sufficiently simple structure
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that strike planning problems could be solved by hand using
the SIRL algorithm. However, if this is not the case, the
algorithm is readily amenable to being programmed for com-
puter calculation.
Recommendations for Further Study ; Two serious drawbacks
of the procedure discussed in this paper are the failure
to incorporate repair time into the model, and the lack of
consideration of aircraft vulnerability. The former dis-
crepancy could most easily be remedied by expanding the time
unit considered from one day to, say, one month-- or to
whatever length of time is required to encompass the longest
repair time of all targets under consideration. Such a
procedure should provide a strike profile for the extended
time period (e.g., one month), and additional criteria
would be needed for determining the day-to-day allocation
of the month's sorties.
Similarly, it would be highly desirable to devise a
method to account for aircraft vulnerability at various
targets. One approach might be to work with estimates of
expected number of aircraft lost at each target, and assign
some negative utility to the loss of an aircraft. Such a
procedure, of course, would require a decision on the
commensurability of aircraft losses and network capacity
reduction; i.e., how many aircraft is one willing to sacri-
fice in order to reduce network capacity by a particular
amount?
Finally, as discussed previously, additional work is re-
quired in the area of determination of L . . and C. . values.
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VI . SUMMARY
A method has been devised for determining the op-
timum allocation of air attack sorties for interdiction of
a transportation network, in the instance where the flow
of supplies is network-limited. The method is dependent
upon estimates of upper and lower bounds on the capacities
of the various segments of the network, and upon the esti-
mates of the number of sorties required to effect reduction
in capacity from one value to some lower value.
The procedure determines the minimum achievable route
length through the topological dual of the network, which
is tantamount to the minimum achievable minimum cut set
of the primal network, and hence the minimum achievable
network capacity. An algorithm is used for determining
this route; it functions by considering the shortest route
through the dual network and the number of sorties required
to achieve it. If that number is greater than the number
available, the route length is increased, and the number of
sorties concurrently reduced, in the most efficient manner,
until the number required equals the number available.
This process is repeated for the second shortest route, and
the third shortest, etc., until a route is found whose ab-
solute minimum value is in fact achievable, or until a
route is found whose absolute minimum value is greater than
the minimum achievable length of some previously considered
route. The algorithm terminates at this point.
The inputs required for the computational procedure
are the total number of sorties available, the maximum
40
capacity of each arc of the network, the lowest value to
which that capacity can be reduced, and the number of sorties
required to bring about this reduction. The outputs gener-
ated are the set of arcs which should be interdicted, the
number of sorties which should be flown against these arcs,
and the flow capacity of the network after the sorties have
been flown.
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